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NONMATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION:
DAMAGES, RESCISSION, AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF EFFICIENT FRAUD
Emily Sherwin*
Buried in the details of legal doctrine governing
misrepresentation is a remedial anomaly that raises some interesting
questions about how law should deal with moral wrongs such as
fraud.' We tend to think of deliberate deception-fraud-as a grave
moral wrong. At least, we think of deception as gravely wrong when
the deceiver's objective is not to avert harm or spare feelings, but to
obtain someone's money or goods. Deception denies the autonomy
of the person deceived and undermines the foundation of trust in
human interaction. 2 The law, however, does not penalize every
instance of fraud. Moreover, the standards governing when fraud is
actionable vary according to the remedy sought.
I. Two RULES
The two principal civil remedies for misrepresentation are tort
damages and rescission accompanied by restitution of benefits

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Thanks to Kevin Clermont,
Thomas Smith, and Christopher Wonnell for very helpful comments, and to the
University of San Diego for generous research support.
1. The topic for this Article surfaced in the course of research on a larger
work-in-progress on deception in law and morality, to be co-authored with
Larry Alexander.
2. On the immorality of lying, see generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978); Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed
Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, in IMMANUEL KANT:

CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Louis W.

Beck, ed. & trans., 1976); Alasdair Maclntyre, Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral
Philosophers: What Can We Learn From Mill and Kant?, in 16 THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 309 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1995); Christine
M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing With Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 325 (1986).
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conferred.3
Rules governing recovery of damages for
misrepresentation are set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts;
rules governing rescission appear in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and the Restatement of Restitution. For both purposes,
misrepresentation is broadly defined to include not only false
statements but also misleading conduct, concealment, half-truth, and
other behavior designed to instill false beliefs.4 However, to obtain
damages for the tort of deceit, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant's misrepresentation was "material." 5 Thus, if the seller of
a home tells the buyer that Jewel is thinking of moving nearby,
knowing this to be untrue, the buyer cannot later claim damages
(unless the seller knew the buyer was unusually motivated by Jewel).
In contrast, both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
Restatement of Restitution allow rescission for "either a fraudulent or
a material misrepresentation.' '6
In other words, if the
misrepresentation was deliberate, materiality is not required. The
Jewel-obsessed buyer is entitled to rescind.
The apparent source of the rule for rescission-materiality is not
required-is Samuel Williston. William Page, discussing rescission
in his 1920 treatise on contracts, asserted that "[t]o constitute fraud
3. See generally 2 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES (2d ed.
1993) [hereinafter DOBBS, REMEDIES] (remedies for misrepresentation); 1 E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1998) (rescission
and restitution); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (remedies for

misrepresentation).
4. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

159 cmts. a, b (1981)

(misrepresentation defined); id. § 160 (concealment); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION § 8 cmt. b (1937) (misrepresentation defined);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. b (1977) (misrepresentation

defined), id.§ 527 (ambiguous representation), id. § 529 (incomplete
statement), id. § 550 (concealment). Nondisclosure is sometimes a ground for
damages or rescission if the court determines there was a duty to disclose in
the circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161
(referring to good faith and standards of fair dealing); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION § 8(1)(c) & cmt. b (referring to duty to disclose);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (referring to reasonable expectations

of disclosure in light of relationship and custom).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(1).

6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §164(1); RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 9 cmt. b. The tentative new Restatement (Third)
of Restitution continues this rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 13 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
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the representation must be material." 7 Williston, in his contracts
treatise of the same year, agreed that "[I]t is laid down" that fraud
must be material. 8 But Williston went on to express his own opinion
that a fraudulent party should not be allowed to argue that the fraud,
although successful, was not material. 9 A deliberate wrongdoer, in
other words, should not escape with the goods.
In 1932, the first Restatement of the Law of Contracts adopted
Williston's view, providing that either "fraud or material
misrepresentation" renders a transaction voidable. 10 Comments in
that Restatement closely tracked the reasoning of Williston's
treatise. 1 The 1936 Restatement of the Law of Restitution followed
the same rule. Writing more recently, Allan Farnsworth observed
that cases granting rescission for non-material fraud are "difficult to
find.' 2 Yet, Farnsworth agreed that rescission should not depend on
materiality, and Williston's view has been carried forward as blackletter law in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the draft
Restatement (Third) of Restitution.
II. THE MEANING OF MATERIALITY
The precise meaning of materiality is somewhat elusive. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a black letter definition: a
misrepresentation is material if "a reasonable man would attach
importance to [it]... in determining his course of action" 13 or
alternatively, if the defendant knew or had reason to know it had
special significance for the plaintiff. 14 Yet, the role of materiality
7. WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 308 (2d ed.
1920).
8. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1490 (1920).

9. See id.
10. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 476(1) (1932).

11. Seeid. cmt. b.
One who makes an innocent misrepresentation of an unimportant fact
has no reason to suppose that his statement will cause action, but fraud
is directed to that very end, or is expected to achieve it, and if the
result is achieved the fraudulent person cannot be allowed to insist on
his bargain.
12. FARNSWORTH, supranote 3, § 4.12.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977).
14. Id. § 538(2)(b). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts incorporates
into its definition of fraud a requirement that the defendant must have intended
that his assertion would "induce a party to manifest his assent...."
Because a
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1) (1981).
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within the overall doctrine of misrepresentation is unclear. All
sources agree that to claim either damages or rescission for
misrepresentation, the plaintiff must show "justifiable reliance" on
the defendant's representation. Materiality is either a separate
requirement or a subcategory ofjustifiable reliance, depending on the
source one consults. 15 Prosser and Keeton explain the relationship
between justifiable reliance and materiality by saying that, while
other elements of justifiable reliance are concerned with
representations that should not be believed (such as a seller's
statement that the defendant knows or should know will have significance for
the plaintiff counts as material, this aspect of the contracts rule narrows the
scope of rescission for non-material fraud. Nevertheless, it is possible that a
misrepresenter (for example, the seller who asserts that Jewel is shopping in
the neighborhood) may intend-that is, wish-to induce assent, and yet have
no realistic hope of doing do. In such a case, the representation is fraudulent
but not material.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525, sets out the basic conditions
for recovery of damages for misrepresentation, including justifiable reliance:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain
from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in
deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon
the misrepresentation.
Comments to section 525 refer to a series of later sections as defining when
reliance is justifiable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. a.
Among these is section 538 on materiality, which states that reliance is "not
justifiable unless the matter misrepresented is material." Id. § 538(1).
Similarly, Prosser and Keeton suggest in the course of a somewhat disjointed
discussion that materiality is a branch of the requirement of justifiable reliance.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 108. Dobbs states that "justifiable
reliance may be regarded as encompassing materiality." DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 470 n. 1 (2000).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

164 sets out conditions for

rescission, treating materiality and justifiable reliance as separate requirements
and confining the materiality requirement to non-fraudulent misrepresentation.

Comments to section 162, which define materiality, distinguish materiality
from justifiable reliance, stating that "[t]he materiality of a misrepresentation is
determined from the viewpoint of the maker, while the justification of reliance
is determined from the viewpoint of the recipient." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 162 cmt. c.

In any event, the reason why the Restatement (Second) of Contracts rejects
materiality in the context of rescission for fraudulent misrepresentation is not
that materiality and justifiable reliance are redundant but that it is undesirable
to absolve a deliberately fraudulent defendant from liability on the ground that
the fraud was minor. See id. § 164 cmt. b (quoted supra, text accompanying
note 14).
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"puffing" or an adverse party's statement of opinion), materiality
is
16
on.
acted
be
not
should
that
representations
with
concerned
Prosser and Keeton also imply that both requirementsjustifiable reliance and materiality-are best understood as testing
the credibility of the claim that fraud induced the plaintiff to act. 17 In
other words, the object of both requirements is to screen out
pretextual claims put forward after adverse market conditions have
rendered a bargain unprofitable. 1 8 This view, however, makes
materiality redundant of causation.' 9 If causation is the concern it
seems preferable to approach it directly rather than confuse legal
doctrine with a materiality requirement.
Perhaps the most straightforward reading of the materiality
requirement is that some fraudulent misrepresentations, even if
deliberate, believed, believable, and acted on in fact, should not have
legal consequences. In other words, materiality is a de minimus
limitation, marking off a zone in which proven fraud is tolerated by
law. In the view of the Restatements, this limitation is applicable to
tort damages but not to rescission.
III. REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY
The discrepancy in rules governing damages and rescission is
puzzling because the reasons, if any, for a materiality requirement
are likely to be weightier when the remedy for fraud is rescission
than when the remedy is damages. In a tort action, the need to
establish damages is a natural obstacle to claims based on
In an action for rescission, there is greater
nonmaterial fraud. 20acin'

16. See PROSSER & KEETON, supranote 3, § 108 (emphasis added).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (reliance in fact), § 537

(misrepresentation must cause loss), § 549 (legal cause) (misrepresentation
must cause loss), § 549(1) (legal cause).
20. Damages are for proven pecuniary injury. The most common measure
is a "benefit-of-the-bargain" measure, allowing the plaintiff the difference
between the value of what he received and the value he would have received if
the representation had been true. The alternative is an "out-of-pocket"
measure in which the plaintiff receives the difference between what he paid
and the value he received. See DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 3, § 9.2(1), at
548-53. There are no nominal damages or presumed damages for the affront
of having been deceived. See id. at 548.
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incentive to press the claim in order to avoid an unwanted
transaction.
One view of the matter is that the rule for rescission is simply
more enlightened. Tort rules, it might be said, reflect antiquated
business ethics and a laissez-faire approach to regulation. 2 1 Active
intervention by treatise writers and the restatements has placed the
rules for rescission and restitution on sounder moral footing.
Perhaps the rarity of damage claims for nonmaterial fraud has made
similar intervention unnecessary in tort law, but in principle the
materiality requirement should be dropped.
An alternative view is that materiality serves a useful functiona function intuited by early courts but overlooked by scholars
seeking to refine the law of contract and restitution. The function
that comes most quickly to mind is protecting the security of
transactions.22 Concern for stability and reliability is frequently cited
in support of limits on legal intervention in commercial settings:
Potential liability or disruption based on defects in the bargaining
23
process makes the value of formally valid transactions uncertain.
A materiality requirement for fraud claims reduces uncertainty by
limiting the field of viable claims.
In the context of fraud, however, the stability-of-transactions
argument has at best a modest appeal. With or without a materiality
requirement, potential defendants concerned about their bargains
presumably can avoid uncertainty by avoiding deception. The
prospect of damages or rescission based on innocent
misrepresentation could indeed cast doubt on transactions. A
fraudulent misrepresentation, however, is by definition deliberateknown to be false and intended to deceive. Therefore, a party who
has spoken and acted candidly need not be concerned.24
21. Cf PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 108, at 751-53 (noting a
change in interpretation of justifiable reliance in response to "a new standard
of business ethics," although not challenging the materiality requirement).
22. See id. at 753; cf FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 4.12, at 459 (finding
that this rationale provides "feeble support" for a materiality requirement in
cases of fraud).
23. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, § 4.15, at 472 (discussing
rescission).
24. This may be the idea expressed in comments to section 476 of the first
Restatement of the Law of Contracts. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 476(1) cmt. b (1932) (quoted supra,note 11).
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Another possibility, which may be viewed as subversive, is that
fraud itself is functional, at least at a low level.2 5 Fraud causes deals
to be made: when one party believes the bargain is better (for him)
than it is, he is more likely to agree. Of course, if the bargain is so
bad that the defrauded party will lose value in the agreed exchange,
there is no efficiency gain and, therefore, no social interest in
promoting or enforcing the transaction. 26 Low-level fraud, however,
should not result in markedly inefficient exchanges. Instead, it may
help to overcome bargaining impasses that might otherwise prevent a
mutually beneficial exchange.
The reason why fraud might sometimes be efficient is this:
Most exchanges generate a surplus, which the parties must divide
through negotiation before the bargain can be closed. The ultimate
distribution of surplus has no efficiency consequences, as long as the
27
exchange itself places the underlying resources in the right hands.
Costs incurred in the process of dividing surplus are lost from a
social point of view. Meanwhile, if serious differences arise in
negotiation over surplus as a result of error or intransigence, the
efficient exchange may never occur. At this stage of the transaction,
a little deception may help the bargaining process along. If each
party can be convinced that he has bested the other, both will be
25. Several authors have identified efficiencies that may result from legal
rules that permit nondisclosure or even affirmative fraud. See Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.

1, 9, 13-18 (1978) (explaining that a privilege of nondisclosure
creates incentives to gather information); Saul Levmore, Securities and
Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 117, 140
(1982) (explaining that allowing buyers to withhold information about or even
to misrepresent their plans can thwart inefficient strategic behavior by sellers);
Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclosure,
LEGAL STUD.

41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 329, 377 (1991) (explaining that privileges of non-

disclosure can be efficient in four ways: By facilitating the merger of
information and resources, by internalizing the benefits of entrepreneurship
and information gathering, by supporting trades that signal price changes, and
by minimizing strategic use of disclosed information).
26. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.6 (5th

ed. 1998) (explaining why fraud is undesirable).
27. Rules that affect the distribution of surplus may cause parties to act
strategically to position themselves in advance for an advantageous
distribution. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW

219-20 (1994) (discussing pre-bargaining incentives). But in such a case it is
the behavior, not the distribution itself, that produces inefficiency.
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eager to close. In this way, the deal-making capacity of fraud
becomes useful.
Fraud may seem an odd prescription for bargaining problems.
Yet, it is worth noting that minor fraud is a widespread, even
customary, practice. Few people follow unqualified rules of truth
and candor in commercial relations. Instead, we seem to internalize
a sense of allowable and prohibited deception. 28 We consider it
wrong to falsify a resume but not to dress deceptively well for an
interview, and we happily understate the maximum we will pay for
something we are negotiating to buy. It may be that customs of
minor deception exist because there is no reasonable way to stop
minor deception. But customary deception may also reflect a
common-sense intuition that this sort of deception can be
beneficial.29
If in fact deception can facilitate bargaining over surplus, the
materiality standard can be seen as a rough means of protecting
efficient fraud. The definition of materiality set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts does not map perfectly onto the
threshold of mutually beneficial exchange, beyond which the parties
are simply bargaining over division of surplus. Some matters may be
important to a reasonable person, and yet not essential to the
efficiency of a particular exchange; and some exchanges are efficient
precisely because one party privately values the goods for a reason
many would consider unimportant. Yet, most matters that, if
falsified, would produce seriously inefficient outcomes are likely to
qualify as material. And, at least if courts are loose in their
application of the Restatement definitions, materiality provides them
with a doctrinal means for sorting intuitively between matters that
undermine the efficiency of exchange and matters that do not.
Thus, it is at least possible that the materiality standard has
practical value, either because it protects the stability of transactions
or because it tolerates efficiency-enhancing, low-level fraud. Yet,
these rationales do not explain why the law has adopted a materiality
28. I am setting aside personal relations where our understanding of
allowable deception is much more generous.
29. On the benefits of custom, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Customary
Practices and the Law of Torts, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND TIE LAW 579 (Peter Newman ed., 1998), arguing that custom

represents cumulative wisdom, which is likely to produce efficient results
when developed among repeat players in consensual settings.
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standard for deceit but not for rescission. In fact, they seem equally
30
applicable, if not more significant, in the context of rescission.
Why, then, has materiality been preserved in one case but not in the
other?
The distinction among remedies may reflect a tendency to
The
differentiate morally between damages and restitution.
arguments suggested above in favor of a materiality standard are
practical ones. Meanwhile, fraud remains an affront to autonomy
and trust, widely felt to be a moral wrong. Rescission is a remedy
with origins in Chancery, and restitution is based on "unjust
enrichment," a term that naturally evokes considerations of justice
and ethics. Therefore, scholars who state the rules for rescission and
restitution-if not the courts that apply those rules-may prefer to
sacrifice practical benefits for moral rectitude in dealing with these
remedies. Rules for rescission take the high ground, while the
damages remedy accommodates practical concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION

I have criticized in previous writing this tendency to elevate
restitution to a higher moral plane. 3 1 In my view, there is no good
reason why moral considerations should carry more weight in the
context of restitution than they do in the context of tort law and
compensatory remedies. Either materiality has sufficient practical
value to justify it as a limit on legal liability for fraud, in which case
it should apply equally to damage remedies and to rescission; or
deliberate fraud is an evil the law should not tolerate in commercial
relations, in which case materiality should be irrelevant to any
remedy.

30. If tort claims for deceit extended to emotional and dignitary complaints,
concerns about the volume of claims might support a materiality rule for
deceit, but this is not the case. Recovery for deceit is limited to pecuniary
injury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 549 (1977); DOBBS,
REMEDIES, supra note 3, at 548.

31. See Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle
of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 2104-08 (2001).
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